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Building European Defence: An Architect 
and a Bank  
Jo Coe lmont & Sven Biscop 
If a set of investors plan a grand 
apartment building in which they can 
each afford just one apartment, they 
need an architect to design a building 
that is both affordable and that meets all 
their needs, to negotiate with the 
constructor, and to ensure follow-up. 
When building capabilities for European 
defence, the sole possible architect is the 
European Defence Agency (EDA). 
Those who have to reach consensus and 
invest are the EU Member States. And 
there is even a European Investment 
Bank (EIB) to assist them. 
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lend a sense of urgency to the implementation 
of these decisions and see an acceleration of 
defence cooperation, for continued 
inefficiency is now even less acceptable than 
before. Some Member States have even 
announced that they will increase their defence 
budgets. At the very least the crisis ought to 
produce a stabilization of European defence 
spending – any further defence budget cuts 
will raise some eyebrows among the general 
public.  
 
The most cost-effective way to use European 
defence budgets remains cooperation. 
Systematic and long-term or – dare one say it 
– permanent and structured cooperation, 
requires a holistic approach to capabilities, 
encompassing: new capabilities, with a focus 
on the strategic shortfalls, as well as the 
restructuring of existing capabilities; research 
and development (R&D); and defence 
planning.  
 
NEW CAPABILITIES  
The first step towards systematic common 
development of new capabilities is to ensure 
that no opportunities for cooperation are 
overlooked.  
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Member States should cooperate more, and 
the most effective way for them to do so is 
through the EDA. To that end, Member States 
must be given incentives, while the EDA (with 
the European External Action Service or 
EEAS) has been tasked with the development 
of a policy framework. The end result must be 
systematic and long-term cooperation. This is 
what stands out from the December 2013 
European Council conclusions on military 
capabilities. The crisis in Ukraine will hopefully 
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The immediate areas of focus have of course 
been identified by the European Council itself, 
which welcomed multinational programmes in 
four areas: drones, air-to-air refuelling, satellite 
communication, and cyber. And it should not 
be forgotten that in December 2011 the 
Foreign Affairs Council prioritized eight more 
areas, including smart munitions and ISTAR. 
If programmes leading to new European 
platforms are to be launched in these 12 areas, 
in order to really reduce our dependence on 
the US, more contributions are urgently 
needed from more Member States. The stakes 
are high, and the potential is great. If Airbus 
became a global leader, so the Remotely 
Piloted Aircraft System initiative (RPAS) can 
produce a global player. 
 
The institutions have a role to play in stressing 
the importance of participation to the Member 
States which have so far remained reticent, but 
the capitals that have already assumed a 
leading role need to play an even stronger part 
in bringing these states to the table through 
targeted bilateral diplomacy. It is harder to 
dismiss an invitation to take part in a 
programme when it comes from a fellow Head 
of State or Government rather than a 
European official.  
 
On a more permanent basis, the EDA can 
offer a dissemination mechanism and a 
discussion platform to Member States, or 
clusters of Member States, whenever they seek 
partners for any specific plans and intentions 
related to existing or future capabilities. 
Furthermore, the Agency need not just 
passively wait for Member States to approach 
it, but can proactively invite Member States 
that are known to be considering certain 
projects. Passage via the EDA whenever a 
multinational project is being considered could 
even be made compulsory, allowing the 
Agency to formulate (non-binding) 
recommendations. In addition, the EDA can 
offer Member States a systematic analysis of 
draft white books, defence reviews etc. in 
function of commonly identified shortfalls, 
priorities and redundancies, and of other 
Member States’ known plans and intentions.  
 
WHY THROUGH THE EDA?  
However, it’s not just a matter of identifying 
opportunities for cooperation. Member States 
must also be convinced to make use of them. 
This is where the EDA must position itself as 
the indispensable architect who can design 
tailor-made cooperation for every project. Why 
should a Defence Policy Director, Service 
Chief, National Armaments Director, Chief of 
Defence, or indeed a Minister of Defence 
favour multinational programmes via the 
EDA? Because it can offer incentives that they 
cannot reasonably ignore.  
 
This is the argument for the architect:  
 
Cost arguments come to mind first. 
Cooperation can drastically reduce not only the 
cost of development and acquisition, but also 
the life-cycle cost of any programme. The 
starting point is a common configuration for 
equipment (instead of “gold-plating” it by 
introducing superfluous national 
specifications), followed by common updates 
throughout its life-cycle. In addition, once the 
platforms have been delivered, permanent 
common logistics and maintenance can be set 
up (through pooling and/or specialization 
between the countries participating in the 
programme). If the participating Member 
States so decide, even the use of the capability 
can be commonly managed (as in European 
Air Transport Command or EATC, which the 
European Council put forward as a model).  
 
The key is that the EDA is the coordinator of 
the programme throughout its life-cycle, from 
chairing a common configuration board of 
Member States, to acting as a single point of 
contact with the private contractor, driving 
cooperation on logistics and maintenance, to 
managing the updates decided upon by the 
Member States. Members of the F16 
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Multinational Fighter Programme will 
recognise this, for this is exactly what it has 
successfully achieved – which demonstrates 
that it is possible.  
 
Exempting any projects thus launched from 
VAT (an exemption from which NATO 
already benefits) seems but logical.  
 
Funding arguments  are crucial as well. 
Through the EDA the Member States 
participating in a programme could tap into 
further European resources. The European 
Council consecrated the role of the 
Commission in European defence. This should 
not remain limited to R&D. The possibility of 
Commission participation in dual-use 
programmes at the same level as the Member 
States ought to be assessed, including in any 
multinational structures set up during its life-
cycle. If e.g. ten Member States joined up to 
build a drone or a satellite, why shouldn't the 
Commission participate as if it were an 
eleventh Member State? It certainly needs this 
capacity, for FRONTEX, ECHO and many 
more programmes. With the EDA acting as 
the leading organization, Member States need 
not fear for their prerogatives, so why not pool 
and share with the Commission?  
 
Payment schedules  are at times even more 
crucial. One of the obstacles to multinational 
cooperation is the reality that potential 
participating states rarely have budget available 
at the same time. Through the EDA, the 
European Investment Bank (EIB) could allow 
Member States to have an account into which 
they could make down payments for a specific 
project as soon as they have been authorized 
by their political authorities. Thus Ministries of 
Defence could avoid falling victim to 
subsequent budget cuts or having to return 
allocated budgets to the Treasury if they had 
not been spent within the fiscal year. Member 
States could also borrow funds, in order not to 
miss the opportunity to join in a project while 
waiting for national funds to become available. 
In addition they could choose to spread the 
payment schedule over a longer period (even 
over the entire life-cycle of a project) if that 
were the only way in which they could 
participate. The latter comes close to leasing – 
but why not?  
 
Operat ional arguments are naturally of the 
essence. The more the EDA can assume a 
central coordinating role in common capability 
development, the more it will be able to 
guarantee: interoperability between 
programmes and countries; the acquisition of 
nothing but state of the art equipment; and 
continuous updates to keep it at that level.  
 
Finally, the of f se ts  argument comes into play 
as well. The EDA could negotiate a general 
policy on technology transfer with the 
Commission, and coordinate a specific return 
of technology among Member States for each 
programme.  
 
RESTRUCTURING OF CAPABILITIES  
Cooperation to make better use of existing 
capabilities and to create new capabilities goes 
hand in hand with a restructuring of national 
forces. The acquisition of new capabilities will 
demand doing away with existing duplications 
at all levels. The EDA can offer its services as 
an honest broker, assessing the effectiveness 
and efficiency of pooling and sharing schemes, 
applying best practices from successful models 
such as EATC. Furthermore, the possibility of 
using the EU’s structural funds to compensate 
for base closures that result from the choice 
for multinational cooperation can be explored 
through the EDA.  
 
R&D  
Just as in capability development, in defence 
R&D the EDA can position itself as the self-
evident point of entry for any multinational 
initiative. Again, Member States will only be 
convinced if they see clear benefits. Through 
the Agency, the critical mass can be achieved 
that Member States individually, with mostly 
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very low R&D budgets, cannot generate. At the 
same time by acting as coordinator the EDA can 
ensure that all participants’ centres of excellence 
receive their due.  
 
In addition, the EDA can act as a multiplier: 
each Euro invested by a Member State can be 
complemented with more Euros from the 
Commission, either under Horizon 2020 for 
dual-use aspects, or under the future Preparatory 
Action for defence per se. The EDA can act as 
the focal point through which Member States 
can provide input and draw upon funds under 
the latter.  
 
AN EDA YEARBOOK  
As a further stimulus to cooperation, the EDA 
can publish an open source “balance” of 
European defence, permanently updated and 
publicly available online, focusing on 
multinational initiatives.  
 
DEFENCE PLANNING AND STRATEGY  
If the short-term priorities are clear, longer term 
capability needs are not. There is as yet no 
reflection on Europe’s capability needs in 20 to 
30 years' time, in NATO (because the NATO 
Defence Planning Process does not really look 
beyond each four-year cycle) or the EU (because 
the Capability Development Plan or CDP does 
not really go into detail). Yet if capabilities are 
desired by then, the time to start thinking about 
them is now, in view of the many years that 
always elapse between the conception of a new 
capability and its coming into service.  
 
To that end, the EU could proactively invite all 
Member States to a discussion about long-term 
capability needs, in order to define requirements 
and start programmes collectively from the very 
start. Because of its newly consecrated role in 
defence, the Commission should be part of this 
debate as well. The updated CDP can frame and 
in turn be alimented by such a discussion. More 
than a one-off event, this could lead to a 
permanent and structured dialogue about 
defence planning as a whole between Member 
States willing to participate. Almost like a 
“permanent capability conference” such 
dialogue alone can ensure that eventually all 
shortfalls are addressed and no new 
redundancies arise.  
 
Ideally however such a capabilities discussion 
ought to be framed in a strategic view of 
Europe’s level of ambition as a security 
provider. Elements of this exist. The Headline 
Goal remains in force, but its ambition of 
deploying at corps strength is mostly ignored. 
The EU Military Staff applies five illustrative 
scenarios to generate detailed capability 
requirements, but these are in need of an 
update. As Europe’s broader neighbourhood 
has become increasingly volatile, and as the US 
strategic focus shifts toward Asia, this strategic 
debate is more urgent than ever. The basic 
question is deceptively simple: in addition to 
our Article 5 obligations, which demand a 
strong conventional deterrence, which security 
and defence responsibilities does Europe (i.e. 
the European Allies and Partners or the EU 
Member States) want to be able to assume 
outside its territory, if necessary without US 
assistance?  
 
The strategic chapter of the High 
Representative’s preparatory report for the 
December 2013 European Council offers the 
clearest ever indication of what the level of 
ambition could be: Europe needs strategic 
autonomy; in its broad neighbourhood; in 
order to protect interests; by projecting power; 
with partners but alone if necessary. 
Furthermore, the Maritime Security Strategy 
highlights the fact that Europeans have a vital 
stake in global maritime security. The next 
High Representative would do well to take this 
as a starting point when taking up the 
European Council’s tasking to assess the 
implications of the changing geopolitical 
environment (in layman’s terms: to produce a 
strategy).  
 
Clear and quantifiable long-term capability 
 
EGMONT Royal Institute for International Relations 
 
 5 
 
needs can then be derived from this strategy by 
the EU Military Committee, to guide future 
cooperation via the EDA. The aim is not to 
create an “EUDPP” alongside the NATO 
Defence Planning Process (NDPP), but to insert 
the collective European level of ambition into 
the NDPP priorities, which can then steer both 
national and common European defence efforts.  
 
CONCLUSION  
There are architects who have achieved 
international fame despite the fact that hardly 
any of their projects ever left the drawing board, 
but they are few and far between. The EDA 
must ensure therefore that its designs are 
implemented. That in turn requires that those 
who have commissioned the architect must be 
on board and invest: the Member States. That 
first indispensable step has yet to be taken. It is a 
risky expression perhaps, but this really is “l’heure 
de l’Europe”. On both sides of the Atlantic 
pragmatists have come to realize that the 
Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), 
through the EDA and the Commission, with the 
EIB, offers the best chance of creating more 
European capabilities through European 
cooperation. But if that chance is lost, patience 
with European structures, and in the US, with 
European capitals, will quickly run out. We 
may find ourselves not just without a CSDP, 
but without the US as well. The assignment is 
clear: capabilities now, capabilities in the 
future, and a common idea on when to use 
them.  
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